On soutient souvent que le bien moral, l’activité intellectuelle correcte et les plaisirs comme tels sont des biens dans le même sens. Mais la réflexion montre que, tandis que les deux premiers sont des biens au sens de choses à admirer, le plaisir comme tel n’est jamais à admirer, simplement pour son caractère plaisant. Pourtant nous sentons le devoir de produire certains plaisirs qui ne sont pas à admirer, c’est-à-dire qui sont moralement neutres, par exemple des plaisirs des sens pour (...) les autres, et, d’une manière encore plus évidente, le devoir de ne pas produire pour eux des peines des sens, moralement neutres. C’est pourquoi il paraît que, à côté du sens du mot « bien » comme « digne d’admiration », nous devons reconnaître un autre sens, celui de « digne d’intérêt », et qu’il est autant de notre devoir de produire ce qui est bien en ce sens que ce qui est bien dans l’autre sens. (shrink)

مداخلة مترجمة عن الفرنسية للفيلسوف الفرنسي جيل دولوز.

This paper examines the following distinctive republican claims: (1) goodwill and virtuous self-restraint are insufficient to realize freedom; and (2) suitable law is constitutive of freedom. In the contemporary literature, these claims are commonly defended in connection with the conception of freedom as nondomination. This account, however, is often rejected on the grounds that freedom as nondomination is moralized and impossible to realize. In response, I propose that the point of protecting people from domination is better understood not as realizing (...) freedom, but instead as giving persons a civic status as equals. Giving persons a civic status as equals, I claim, realizes an important form of social or 'relational' equality, and I distinguish this aim from giving persons a 'status as nondominated’, as some republicans require. I argue that this account vindicates alternative claims about the insufficiency of goodwill and constitutive importance of suitable law—understood in terms of equality rather than freedom—while avoiding the moralization and impossibility objections. I conclude by suggesting some further advantages of the proposed account versus the standard republican view. (shrink)

There is limited evidence that socially responsible investment (SRI) strategies can resolve persistent concerns brought up in scholarship on the industry, particularly as it relates to considerations of justice. It is critical that SRI initiatives be interrogated about their broader impacts on environmental inequality and justice in the context of global power relations. Drawing upon environmental justice (EJ) theory, we propose a framework for transformative investment to halt the exploitation of humans and environment in pursuit of profit. We posit that (...) transformative investment initiatives, including those related to strategies of screening and shareholder resolutions, would reflect three general conditions of environmental justice. They would require (1) cumulative responsibility that focuses on holistic gains so that investment initiatives do not replace one harm with another; (2) embedded accountability that is rooted in the decision-making and concerns of directly impacted communities; and (3) counter-hegemonic practices that are integrated with broader strategies and movements that challenge structures of oppression and exploitation. Through these principles, we address problems with SRI that have already been identified in scholarship on the subject. Moreover, we draw upon Antonio Gramsci’s concept of ‘strategic power’ to conceptualize the conditions and actions necessary for transformative investment to take root. (shrink)

Several philosophers argue for the ‘convergence thesis’ for positional goods: prioritarians, sufficientarians, and egalitarians may converge on favouring an equal (or not too unequal) distribution of goods that have positional aspects. I discuss some problems for this thesis when applied to two key goods for which it has been proposed: education and wealth. I show, however, that there is a variant of the thesis that avoids these problems. This version of the thesis is significant, I demonstrate, because it applies to (...) a person’s status as a citizen, which I suggest is the central concern of social or ‘relational’ egalitarianism. (shrink)

In recent years, a distinction between two concepts of equality has been much discussed: 'distributive’ equality involves people having equal amounts of a good such as welfare or resources, and ‘social’ or ‘relational’ equality involves the absence of social hierarchy and the presence of equal social relations. This contrast is commonly thought to have important implications for our understanding of the relationship between equality and justice. But the nature and significance of the distinction is far from clear. I examine several (...) accounts of this issue and argue none are entirely satisfactory. In turn, I offer an alternative proposal. Relational equality, on my account, involves a concern with each person having an equal 'civic status'. I characterize this concern and show it has distinctive and normatively significant positional and temporal aspects. (shrink)

This paper shows that expected utility belongs to the intersection of models satisfying betweenness and a homotheticity condition for risky choice. Betweenness models can accommodate variable risk attitudes, originally highlighted by the Allais paradox, by restricting indifference curves to be linear while allowing non-parallelism. Homotheticity, in contrast, restricts indifference curves to be parallel while permitting non-linearities, such as those highlighted by inverse-S probability weighting. Data from an experiment indicate that approximately 2/3s of participants satisfied homotheticity. Of this group, about half (...) satisfied the expected utility hypothesis. The other half violated expected utility and therefore betweenness. These results indicate that homothetic preferences, and in particular those violating betweenness, can be empirically relevant for decision making under risk. (shrink)

How can pain complaints be elicited and analyzed so as to increase the empathic bond between patient and clinician? I will argue that though Wierzbicka’s approach to this question is useful—an exploration of certain abstract dimensions of pain’s meaning—it fails to examine key aspects that are the most useful and crucial for cultural analysis and for building empathic bonds between the clinician and patient. Not just a grammar of pain is needed; rather a biological philology of pain.

John Rawls’s thesis that a certain package of basic liberties should be given lexical priority is of great interest for legal and political philosophy, but it has received relatively little defense from Rawls or his supporters. In this paper, I examine three arguments for the thesis: the first is based on the two ‘moral powers’; the second, on the social bases of self-respect; and the third, on a Kantian notion of autonomy. I argue none of these accounts successfully establishes 1) (...) the distinct claim of lexical priority, 2) for the complete package of basic liberties, on the basis of reasons that are appropriately public. In turn, I propose an alternative argument, in support of those two claims, based on the social or ‘relational’ conception of equality. (shrink)

This paper summarizes and discusses three studies of patterns in the recall of persons in socially bounded communities. Individual sin three different communities (a graduate academic program, a religious fellowship, and a department in a formal organization) free-listed the names of persons in their respective communities. Results indicate that the individuals in each community share a common cognitive structure of community members that is based on the community’s social structure. These studies, combined with the results of other research, strongly suggest (...) that persons are organized in memory according to social structural principles and that affiliation and dominance are the principal dimensions of social cognition. Suggestions are offered for future research to test the generality of these findings. (shrink)

Describes God in simple, easy terms for children.

Throughout Supernatural, we watch the Winchesters resist, embrace, and redefine their roles in the family business, “saving people, hunting things.” These tensions echo a topic that philosophers have explored for thousands of years—free will. According to the existentialist philosopher Jean‐Paul Sartre, each person is in a constant state of shaping himself and his place in the world through free will. Dean is admirable in his ability to resist bad faith and act as captain for Team Free Will. In Supernatural, the (...) choices people make are impacted by their soul. Knowing that Sam could simply walk away from hunting to pursue a normal life shows Dean that they no longer share the same sense of moral responsibility. For good or for ill, Sam and Dean are responsible for their actions, which is better than you'd expect from an ex‐blood junkie and a high school dropout with six dollars in his pocket. (shrink)

Paul Ekman is an American psychologist who pioneered the study of facial behaviour. Bringing together disciplinary history, life study, and history of science, this paper focuses on Ekman’s early research during the twenty-year period between 1957 and 1978. I explicate the historical development of Ekman’s semiotic model of facial behaviour, tracing the thread of iconicity through his life and works: from the iconic coding of rapid signs; through the eventual turn from classifying modes of iconic signification using gestalt categories to (...) classifying modes of producing iconic sign-functions using minimal units; to the role and importance of iconicity for the study of the facial expression of emotion, both in terms of the similarities between iconic and analogue signs as well as the differences between facial coding and linguistic signification. In this intellectual genealogy, I argue not only that Ekman relied extensively upon conceptualizations and terminologies from semiotic thought for the creation of the Facial Action Coding System (FACS), but also that the question of iconicity is the pivotal problem across the many discoveries and innovations in what I term ‘Ekmanian faciasemiotics’. (shrink)

The distinction between ‘relational' and ‘distributive’ equality has come to play an important role in discussions of equality and justice. But the nature of the distinction is not as clear as we might hope. In this regard, Juliana Bidadanure makes an interesting and important proposal: the two views involve differing kinds of temporal concern. The distributive approach, she suggests, is concerned with equality over people’s complete lives (diachronic equality), whereas the relational approach is concerned with egalitarian social relations at each (...) moment in time (synchronic equality). I argue that this suggestion, while insightful, is not entirely satisfactory. Both relational and distributive equality, I demonstrate, have diachronic and synchronic aspects. Nonetheless, they do so in distinctive ways. So, while the diachronic/synchronic distinction does not provide a clean cut between relational and distributive equality, examining the temporal aspects of each approach helps to illuminate their distinctiveness. (shrink)

ABSTRACTConcerned with how individuals assess scientific experts on the Internet, our research investigates the virtual r/science subreddit and their popular Ask-Me-Anything series, where sci...

A philosophical analysis of the pessimistic and nihilistic conditions of the existential possibilities for blackness and antiblack racism in 21st Century America.

This paper examines the historiography of literacy between 1780 and 1830 in Britain. The paper first explores the challenges faced by historians in measuring literacy and examines the lenses through which historians have interpreted the available data. Factors thought to contribute to rising literacy rates in this time period include access to education, the Industrial Revolution, religious movements and gender norms.

(This book, in Portuguese translation, is an accessible introduction to the philosophy of equality and social justice, with a focus on contemporary theories, especially relational egalitarianism.) -/- O que significa para uma sociedade ser igualitária? A igualdade é amplamente reconhecida como valiosa, seja por cidadãos, políticos, juristas ou filósofos. Ademais, a ideia de igualdade desempenha um papel de grande relevância em muitos movimentos sociais do passado e do presente. Há bastante discordância, porém, acerca de como, exatamente, devemos compreender a natureza (...) e a importância da igualdade. O presente ensaio examina estas questões e apresenta um panorama sumário das mais centrais e influentes abordagens filosóficas à igualdade no quadro de diferentes teorias da justiça, concentrando-se, em particular, na ideia de justiça baseada na igualdade de relações sociais. (shrink)

Liberal thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were alert to the political costs and human cruelties involved in European colonialism, but they also thought that European expansion held out progressive possibilities. In Progress, Pluralism, and Politics David Williams examines the colonial and anti-colonial arguments of Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, Jeremy Bentham, and L.T. Hobhouse. Williams locates their ambivalent attitude towards European conquest and colonial rule in a set of tensions between the impact of colonialism on European states, the possibilities (...) of progress in distant and diverse places, and the relationship between universalism and cultural pluralism. In so doing he reveals some of the central ambiguities that characterize the ways that liberal thought has dealt with the reality of an illiberal world. Of particular importance are appeals to various forms of universal history, attempts to mediate between the claims of identity and the reality of difference, and the different ways of thinking about the achievement of liberal goods in other places. Pointing to key elements in still ongoing debates within liberal states about how they should relate to illiberal places, Progress, Pluralism, and Politics enriches the discussion on political thought and the relationship between liberalism and colonialism. (shrink)

In fourteen scholarly yet delightfully readable essays, Ober solves some ancient mysteries and reveals the secret kinks and passions of famous and obscure historical figures.

The call for a biosemiotic perspective within medical semiotics has been steadily increasing over the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. In _Food and Medicine: A Biosemiotic Perspective_, Yogi Hale Hendlin, Johnathan Hope, and the nine contributions in their edited volume boldly seek to bridge the segregation between nature and culture in the medical sciences as well as in the medical humanities. To a large extent, they achieve this aim by explicating the sign relations _in_ food and medicine, the sign (...) relations _of_ medical theory and practice, and the sign relations _between_ the biology in medicine and medicine of society. Taking up a semio-historical approach, I contextualize two select contributions from Hendlin and Hope’s _Food and Medicine_ with the medical semiotics of the Hippocratic tradition. By comparing the biological semiotics from the contributions to the medical semiotics from the Corpus, I critically explicate the ways in which biosemiotics moves this subdiscipline forward and why the perspective is significant not only for the health of humans, but also for the health of other animals, and indeed for the health of the planet that we all inhabit together. On these grounds, I propose a turn from medical semiotics to _health semiotics_. This program for semiotics would encompass not only food and medicine, but also lifestyle and wellbeing, as well as the subjective, qualitative perspectivism that makes biosemiotics frontier research, thereby constituting a biosemioethics and promoting a semiotic fitness. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Practice of SurgeryKaren DevonThere’s no one on the snowy road driving beside me. It’s Christmas Eve, the night the newest attending surgeon on staff gets to be on call. Tonight feels like an anniversary of sorts. The first time I performed an appendectomy “alone” was on Christmas Eve. I can’t recall if it was snowing back then since I hadn’t left the hospital in days. I had assumed (...) that while I was operating on that 26–year–old woman with new abdominal pain that moved towards the left lower quadrant, my attending staff on call was sleeping soundly. I didn’t even know where he lived, or how long it would take if something catastrophic were to happen. I phoned the white–haired man to get his blessing just before midnight. “Have you done this operation before?” he asked. “Yes, several, but not completely alone” I confessed. “Go for it and call me when you are done. Oh, and be safe!” Click. Gulp.As I drive in tonight, again past midnight, I reflect upon that night. Was it practice? A right of passage? The most appropriate treatment for the patient? Perhaps it was even safer this way since my attending really had never done this operation the way it is now done—laparoscopically—by residents. I clearly recall telling the patient and her mother, “We do this all the time! The staff surgeon on call will come in if I need him, but the chief residents always do this operation and I feel comfortable taking care of you.” Sign on the dotted line and make sure you read the part where you are told this is a teaching hospital. Not only was independence an expectation, but I was also supposed to teach the more junior house staff how to emulate what I was so expertly performing.That night I took out the rotting appendix without incident and called the grey haired surgeon in the wee hours. “Merry Christmas Doctor. Sorry to bother you. I just wanted to let you know that the patient is awake and doing well.” “Yes I know. Good work” he replied. “I was in my office. Just in case.”As a resident, I was often torn between the need to gain independence in order to learn and grow as a surgeon, and the idea that I was practicing. As most budding surgeons do, I wanted to be the person doing the surgery. Working on my technical skills was clearly an important part of expertise. Surgery is inherently different than other types of medicine. It seemed slightly more difficult for someone to stop my cutting, than to catch the error in a prescription, before some damage is done. Perhaps a little more like driving a car, than learning to use a calculator. Recently a more modern surgical education is evolving, whereby students practice by simulations on machines. Yet educators know that ultimately many “firsts” need to occur with real patients. That proficiency and expertise are more than a diagnosis, a steady hand, or even the two combined. If the experience of operating as the primary surgeon without immediate supervision, on a patient with acute appendicitis never occurred until we passed licensing exams wouldn’t that be more harmful? I may have been the least legally responsible for outcomes, that night of my own first, when the grey–haired surgeon took the [End Page E1] responsibility of trusting me. But in fact, the obligation I felt was enormous. We cannot simulate the weight of responsibility that comes when responsible for another human being, who you have met and who provides their trust in you. Furthermore, as the teachers of this art and science, we need to balance our obligations to each individual patient with our obligation to society to train competent and caring future surgeons. Surgery would have no history if the “practice” of surgery had nothing to do with practice, defined in its simplest form, yet how do we cover all of this during the late night conversation that is called informed consent. Interestingly since that December evening and for the next 200 laparoscopic appendectomies before my graduation in to... (shrink)

The role of judgments of beauty in scientific theory evaluation is the subject of significant debate in contemporary philosophy of science. This book advances that debate by broadening its scope. In Judgments of Beauty in Theory Evaluation, the author argues that judgments of beauty are a justified part of theory evaluation of all sorts: not only scientific theory evaluation, but also philosophical theory evaluation. The author argues for this thesis by providing an account of beauty—inherited from Kant and Mothersill—on which (...) the distinctive nature of judgments of beauty is that they are unprincipled, yet possible. The author then analyzes two important methods of theory evaluation—reflective equilibrium and simplicity—and argues that these methods require making judgments of beauty so understood. Finally, the author argues that these methods of theory evaluation are not anomalies, but that they point to a deeper lesson about the nature of theorizing and the necessity of using judgments of beauty to evaluate systems, like theories. This conclusion has implications for the debate in philosophy of science over judgments of beauty, but also prompts a reckoning in philosophy itself over the use of judgments of beauty in philosophical theory evaluation. (shrink)

Explanations in the life sciences frequently involve presenting a model of the mechanism taken to be responsible for a given phenomenon. Such explanations depart in numerous ways from nomological explanations commonly presented in philosophy of science. This paper focuses on three sorts of differences. First, scientists who develop mechanistic explanations are not limited to linguistic representations and logical inference; they frequently employ diagrams to characterize mechanisms and simulations to reason about them. Thus, the epistemic resources for presenting mechanistic explanations are (...) considerably richer than those suggested by a nomological framework. Second, the fact that mechanisms involve organized systems of component parts and operations provides direction to both the discovery and testing of mechanistic explanations. Finally, models of mechanisms are developed for specific exemplars and are not represented in terms of universally quantified statements. Generalization involves investigating both the similarity of new exemplars to those already studied and the variations between them. (shrink)

Ludvig Beckman’s The Boundaries of Democracy offers a sophisticated account of the boundary problem, developing a version of the all-subjected principle understood to involve relations of ‘de facto authority’. I explain the central claims of the book, raise some problems, and suggest some ways in which I think the account could be fruitfully further developed.